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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arnold G. Kartchner came to his death on the 24th day of
June, 1950, following an automobile accident which occurred on
that date at about the hour of 4:50 o'clock P.M. He left surviv3
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ing him as his only heirs-at-law two children, Edna Smith, a
daughter, and Dean Kartchner, a son. The plaintiff, 0. K.
Clay, was appointed by the District Court of Salt Lake County
as the administrator of his estate, and, as such administrator,
brought this action to recover damages from the defendants
growing out of said accident. It is claimed by the plaintiff and
the children of the deceased that the death of the deceased was
caused by the negligence of one Montell Eccles Mangum, who
at the time of the accident was driving a bread truck in the
business of the defendants who operate the Dunford Bread
Company. A trial was had before a jury and a verdict of no
cause of action was returned. The accident occurred on the
south side of 13th South Street in front of the deceased's home
at No. 316 East 13th South Street. Briefly stated the material
facts are as follows:
A map' Exhibit "A" was prepared by Frank J. Cossey a
member of the Engineering Department of Salt Lake City (T.
149). The map is drawn to a scale of one inch to 10 feet.
The traveled portion of 13th South Street is covered with asphalt. On the north side of the street the asphalt extends over
to the north sidewalk. The distance between the south edge
of the north sidewalk and the north edge of the south sidewalk is 50 feet ( T. 151-15 2) . The distance across the asphalt
portion is 40 feet. The distance from the north edge of the
south sidewalk to the south edge of the traveled portion of the
highway is 18 feet (Exhibit "A.") There is an irregular strip
of asphalt which extends beyond the main traveled portion
of the highway. The south irregular edge of the asphalt extends
to a point approximately 10 feet north of the north edge of
4
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the south sidewalk. This ten feet consists of dirt, some gravel,
and some weeds and is not used for motor vehicle travel.
Officer Peterson of the Salt Lake City Traffic Department
made an investigation of the accident. He testified (T 57)
that the macadam or hard portion of 13th South is approximately 41 feet extending from the sidewalk on the north;
that south of the hard portion of the road, there is approximately 9 feet of dirt, gravel, and shoulder; that the impact
occurred 167 feet east of an extended curbline on the east side
of 3rd East, and 3 feet from this extended curbline north toward
the road; that from the north edge of the south sidewalk to
the south edge of the hard portion of the road is approximately
9 feet (T 57-60); that the station wagon was approximately
5 feet wide and was parked within one foot of the sidewalk
facing easterly (T. 58). The Dunford bread truck was 99 feet
east of the point of impact and partly on the shoulder of the
road and facing the sidewalk (T. 59). The officer said (T. 60)
that he determined the point of impact from scuffed marks,
scraped marks on the station wagon itself, dented door handle
on the left front door, brush marks along the fender and hood,
the car itself was dusty and the marks were very recent; it
was brushed clean, the dirt and dust in several places on the
fender and hood had been brushed clean. There was a rear
vision mirror on the side of the ]eft front door that had been
broken off and was lying on the left front fender of the station
wagon (T. 60).

a:.

On the extreme right front of the Dunford truck there
was a slight dent and brush marks about 5 feet 9 inches from
the ground; on the right front door post there was a deep

5
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impresson of what we believed to be specks of fresh blood and
small portions of flesh; pictures of the automobiles involved
were taken by Officer Snell. Exhibit "C" is a photograph of
the Kartchner station wagon parked in front of his home (T.
45). Also it will be noted from Exhibit "E" that the defendants' driver had ample space to have avoided hitting the
deceased in this action had he been keeping a proper lookout.
The picture shows that if two cars were traveling abreast
arrd going east, north of the station wagon that they would
still not have been on the main traveled highway in this position (T. 81-85). Exhibit "D" is a photograph of the bread
truck where it came to a stop after the accident (T. 48). It
will be observed from this photograph that the left front
wheel is slightly off the hard surfaced portion of the road
and the distance between that point and the south sidewalk is
indicated on the photograph. Exhibit "B" shows the interior of the bread truck and certain spots and marks testified
to by Officer Peterson on the outside of the truck (T. 63).
We found brake marks of the bread truck on 13th South that
extended from a point approximately 37 feet west of the rear
wheels of the bread truck in a slanting direction toward the
curb (T. 64). 13th South has a rather gentle slope off toward
the South on the south side of the road; the north side of the
road is more or less level. The brake marks of the Dunford
truck lead to the station wagon which showed a rather slow
arc in the shoulder up along side the station wagon. The
tracks started in a slow turn going away from the hard surface
of the road and then gradually came back toward the hard
surface (T. 67). The tracks started about 100 feet west of
the station wagon and went east toward the station wagon
6
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(T. 68). The point of impact was off from the hard surface
of the road (T. 69).

At the time of impact, the tire marks

of the bread truck were moving away from the station wagon;
that would be the general direction (T. 70). Officer Peterson
placed upon the Exhibit "A" the general course of the tire
marks at the point they left the hard surfaced portion of the
highway up to the point of impact with the station wagon.
These marks are indicated by the red pencil marks starting
at the irregular south edge of the asphalt, then turning to
the south over the shoulder of the road, then back again toward
the hard surfaced portion of the highway, and then stopping
at the point where the bread truck struck the deceased (T.
71) . On the right door post as indicated in the picture of the
bread truck, there was what appeared to be blood stains on
the door post itself (T. 74). Officer Peterson placed on the
map, Exhibit "A," a red pencil dot to indicate the point of
impact (T. 75). At the time the course of the bread truck
was indicated by Officer Peterson, the replica of the st~tion
wagon was not on the map and Officer Peterson testified after
the replica of the station wagon was placed on the map that
the red lines indicating the course of the bread truck did not
give a true picture, and that the tire marks went to the point
of impact. That is as far as we could follow them (T. 76).
The station wagon was entirely off the hard surfaced portion
of the highway. The left hand side of the station wagon was
approximately } or 4 feet south of the edge of the hard surfaced portion of the roadway. I would think the point of
impact would be a foot or two north of the car and possibly
a foot or two off the road surface (T. 78}.
7
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Mr. Montell Eccles Mangum, the driver of the defendants·
truck testified that he made a wide turn on 3rd East and 13th
'
South Street, and after he had completed his turn, he was
looking straight east (T. 171); that he observed particularly
a station wagon automobile parked along the south side of the
road fairly close to the sidewalk and facing east, but he did
not observe any person in the vicinity of that automobile;
that in his best judgment, he was traveling 20 miles per
hour ( T. 172) . As he passed the station wagon, he heard
a thud on the side of the truck and didn't have any idea of
what had happened, but applied his brakes to stop and investigate, and thought posisbly that some kids had thrown
something; he looked at the side of the truck and saw a man
lying in the road. Prior to the moment when he heard this
thump or bump, he did not see Mr. Kartchner (T. 173),
and he was observing down the street at that time; that he
traveled 13th South Street between 3rd and 4th East five
or six days a week and was well acquainted with that street
as well as the hard surface thereon, also the shoulders on
the side and where they parked their cars, but had never seen
people get out of their cars parked at that place; that he
did not always drive as close to parked cars as he did on that
day and he did it on that day because of heavy traffic (T. 174).
He had a clear, unobstructed view from the corner up to the
station wagon and was looking all the time and never did
see Mr. Kartchner (T. 175); that he had a conversation with
the brothers and Mr. Kartchner's mother (T. 176). In that
conversation the driver said he explained to them that he
turned to go up the street, and that it happened so fast he
didn't know how it happened; that he didn't tell them that
8
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he wasn't looking; that he did not see the door of the station
wagon open (T. 177); that he was traveling about 20 miles
per hour when he heard the thud; that he had a good view
of the truck as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit ··B''; he had no
idea he had struck a man ( T. 179) . There was nothing ~o
obstruct his view on his side of the highway; that he was off
the edge of the asphalt and on to the loose gravel (T. 181)
The witness Keith Roberg, 10 years of age, testified that
Kartchner had just closed the door when he got hit (T. 105;
that deceased did not talk to him after he had closed the door
(T. 109).
The witness Ross C. Bradshaw was driving west on 13th
South and was 60 or 75 feet east of the accident when it occurred. The Dunford bread truck was going toward the parked
station wagon and he glanced over and saw Mr. Kartchner,
the deceased, standing by the side of his car facing east (T. 91);
that the truck hit Mr. Kartchner, rolled him alo~g the front
fender, over the hood of the station wagon, rolling him hand
over foot (T. 91-92); that the deceased at the time of the
accident was not standing much over a foot away from the car,
that he did not see the deceased get out of the car-that he
first noticed him standing at the side of the station wagon
facing east. From the time he saw him until the time he was
struck was approximately one second; that he was struck by
11r. Mangum driving the Dunford bread truck; that from his
observation Mr. Kartchner,the deceased, was struck from 6
to 9 feet oH the main traveled portion of the road; that there
were no other automobiles on the highway at the time between
9
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Bradshaw and the station wagon, nor were there any automobiles in front of the Dunford bread truck at the time;
the road was clear except for the Dunford bread truck going
east and Bradshaw going west (T. 95-96).
The witness Mrs. Elien Roberg, was present at a conversation on a Tuesday night about 6:30 or 7:30 P.M. after
the accident, and the driver of the Dunford bread truck was
also present together with other members of the deceased's
family. At that time and place, the driver of the Dunford
bread truck stated that he was looking down at his book or
seat and he didn't know what happened (T. 190-191).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
The appellant asserts that the lower court erred in the
giving of Instruction No. 7.
POINT II
That the court erred in giving Instruction No. 10.
POINT III
The court erred in submitting to the jury the question
of assumption of risk on the part of the deceased for the reason
that there was no issue between the parties which gave rise
to the application of this doctrine and for the reason that the
facts and circumstances shown by the evidence fails to indi10
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cate that the deceased could have assumed the risk of getting
out of his station wagon on the left hand side.
POINT IV
The court erred in failing to give plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 3, in toto, substantially or in a modified form

(T. 26).
ARGUMENT
The evidence in this cause, as detailed in the statement of
facts, shows without substanital dispute that on the afternoon
,)u.,NL
of ~ 24, 1950, the deceased, Arnold Kartchtier, parked
a station wagon which he was then driving~ on the south side
of 13th Street immediately in front of his home and premises
at No. }13 East 13th South Street; that his station wagon was
parked within a matter of inches from the north edge of the
south sidewalk. When he stopped at this point, a young
boy, Keith Roberg, came over to his car and talked to the
deceased. The deceased then opened the left hand door of
the station wagon, got out of the car, shut the door, and was
. standing at the side of the station wagon facing east when he
was struck by the truck of the defendants, driven by their
employee, Mantell Eccles Mangum.
The testimony shows that the deceased was not more than
a foot to the north of the station wagon. 13th South Street
is covered with a hard surfaced material commencing at a
point approximately 10 feet north of the north edge of the
south sidewalk, and that the south edge of the travelled portion of 13th South Street is 18 feet north of the north edge of
the south sidewalk. The parked station wagon is approximatell
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ly 5 feet in width; the replica of the station wagon
attached to Exhibit "A" is not drawn to accurate scale because this replica would indicate the station wagon to be
approximately 71j2 feet in width, whereas in fact, this width
should not exceed 5 feet, according to the testimony (T. 58).
The station wagon therefore occupied 5 feet of the space between the north edge of the south sidewalk and the traveled portion of the highway. The south side of the station wagon was
within 6 inches to 1 foot from the north edge of the south sidewalk and Mr. Kratchner as he left the station wagon was about
1 foot north of the north side of the station wagon. This left a
distance of at least 11 feet between the point where Mr. Kratchner was struck and the south edge of the traveled portion of the
highway, and 3 feet from the extreme irregular edge of
the hard surfaced portion of the road. These distances can
well be calculated from the map, Exhibit "A," and from the
testimony of the various witnesses.
When the defendants' truck struck the body of the deceased, it rolled him along the side of his station wagon and
over the left fender. The course of the defendants' truck as
it moved away from the traveled portion of the highway to
the point of impact is not in substantial conflict. It is clear
that the truck left the traveled part of the highway and turned
in a slow arc until it struck the deceased. It is apparent from
the course of the truck that the driver realized where he was
a short distance from the point of impact, that he was heading
toward the station wagon, because he then attempted to turn
back on to the highway. The space between the south edge
of the traveled portion of the highway to the north edge of
the south sidewalk is 18 feet and this space is not ordinarily
12
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used for motor vehicle travel, and that the area immediately
north of the south sidewalk was used for the parking of
automobiles.

:>

There can be little doubt but that the operator of the defendants' bread truck was guilty of negligence. Any doubt
as to the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action would
arise because of the application of the doctrine of contributory
negligence. As to the negligence of the driver of the bread
truck, it is admitted that his view of the street ahead of him
was unobstructed. Mr. Bradshaw testified that there were no
cars between his car moving west and the bread truck moving
east. Mr. 1\{angum, the driver of the defendants' truck, admitted that after he made the turn to go east from 3rd East
Street on 13th South, that he saw the station wagon of the
deceased parked along the south side of the road parked
parallel and close to the sidewalk, but that he did not see
the deceased; that he was traveling about 20 miles an hour
(T. 171-172). Mr. 11angum admitted that he stated a few
days following the accident that he had turned to go up the
street and that "It happened so fast that I didn't know how
it happened" (T. 177). He also stated that he did not see
the door of the station wagon open although it is clear that
Mr. Kartchner did open the door, did get out of his car, shut
the door, and was standing at the north side of the car facing
east when he was struck (T. 177). Mr .Mangum on crossexamination (T. 178) was asked:
Q. How could he have gotten out without opening the

·... ·

door?
13
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A. He couldn't.
Q. He must have opened the door and you never saw him
open the door, did you?
A. No, sir.
Q. And you never saw him because you weren't looking,
were you?

A: It all happened so fast that I couldn't.
Q. Answer my question. You weren't looking, were you?
A. I was looking straight ahead.

Q. And you didn't see him?
A. That's right.

Q. And you didn't see the door open?
A. That's right.

(T. 178).

The court in the light of the testimony instructed the
jury on the question of the defendant's negligence in Instruction No. 6 (T. 14) that every driver of an automobile shall
exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon
or near any roadway to do any and all things which may
appear necessary to avoid colliding with and injuring a pedestrian, and that a dri':'er is not excused from responsibility when
he does not see a person which by the exercise of proper caution
14
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and observation he could have seen, and that if the jury believed from the evidence that the deceased was in plain view
of the driver of the defendant's truck, and that the driver
either saw or by the exercise of proper caution and observation
could have seen the deceased, and that he failed to do so, that
such want or care on the part of the driver of the bread truck
would constitute negligence. We think this instnKtion correctly presented the question of the defendants' negligence to
the jury and on the basis of such instruction and the undisputed
facts, there could be no questoin but what a jury would have
been compelled to find the defendants guilty of negligence
in causing or contributing to the death of the deceased. In
fact it would seem clear from the evidence that the court could
well have told the jury that the defendants' driver was guilty
of negligence as a matter of law.
POINT I
In the light of the testimony above detailed, the court
instructed the jury by Instruction No. 7 (T. 15) as follows:
"You are instructed that a person cannot deliberately
incur an obvious risk of personal injury, particularly
when there is a safe course of action open to him, and
then hold the author of the danger liable in damages
for any injuries sustained.
If you find from the evidence in this case, that the
deceased, Arnold Kartchner, placed himself in a position of obvious peril when there was no reasonable
justification therefor, then the said Arnold Kartchner
is deemed to have assumed the risk of his course of
conduct and your verdict must be in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action."

15
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This instruction was duly excepted to (T. 208).
We contend that this· instruction is clearly in error. No
reasonable claim could be made that the deceased was negligent in parking his station wagon on the south side of 13th
South Street within a matter of inches from the north edge of
the south sidewalk. He placed his car in the area used for
parking automobiles along the street. If the deceased could
be regarded as being in any way negligent, it would arise out
out the fact that he got out of his station wagon from the
north or left hand side which would be a point closer to the
traveled portion of the highway than if he had left his automobile on the right hand side.
Un_der the wording of this instruction, the jury might
well have concluded that the deceased was negligent as a
matter of law in getting out of his station wagon on the left
hand side. The instruction at least assumes that there was
some evidence in the case from which the jury might conclude
that the deceased deliberately incurred an obvious risk of
personal injury. This thought is further projected into the
instruction in the second paragraph where the court states:
"If it is found that the deceased placed himself in a position
of obvious peril without justification, then the deceased is
deemed to have assumed the risk of his course of conduct,
and that the jury must then find the issues against the plaintiff."
We submit there is no evidence in the record which shows,
or from which any reasonable inference can be drawn that the
'
16
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deceased in alighting from his station wagon on the left hand
side did in fact place himself in obvious peril, or did thereby
deliberately incur an obvious risk. This in turn assumes that
the deceased knew, or was charged with knowledge, that there
was a danger of moving automobiles and trucks coming over
on to the parking area of the street where automobiles are
not ordinarily driven. It further assumes that there is some
evidence in the record that the deceased knew of the risk to
be thus encountered and knew that it endangered his safety.
He could not be charged with knowledge that trucks or automobiles would be apt to leave the traveled portion of the
highway and without slowing or stopping suddenly turn
on to the shoulder and parking area of the road. There is
not a word of evidence to show that the deceased either knew
the truck was approaching the parking area or that it was
coming toward his position in the parking area, nor would the
deceased be required to anticipate that the drivers of trucks
or other vehicles would fail to keep a proper lookout or fail
to keep their respective cars or trucks under control. It is
undoubtedly true that it would have been safer for the deceased to have gotten out of the right hand side of his car,
but certainly he was under no legal duty to do so, and he
cannot be regarded as negligent merely because he alights
from his car at least 12 feet away from where automobiles
and trucks are ordinarily operated on the highway.
The only testimony in the record which would indicate
any negligence on the part of the deceased was the testimony
of the driver of the truck that he did ·see the deceased's car,
but did not see the deceased, from which a possible inference
17
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might be drawn that between the time the truck driver saw the
station wagon, the deceased suddenly got out of his car in
time to be struck.

The only other alternative from which

negligence on the part of the deceased could be inferred
would be the fact that he did get out of the left hand side
of his car, and we submit that such conduct on the part of
the deceased was not negligence even though it may not have
been the safer course. Certainly Instruction No. 7 would
be misleading because it would convey to the jury the impression that there was some evidence in the record from which
it could be said that the deceased did incur an obvious risk
of personal injury, otherwise such an instruction would not
have been given. There is no evidence from which any inference can be drawn that the deceased placed himself in a
position of obvious peril. "Obvious" means open and apparent, and there is nothing to indicate that when the deceased
got out of his car that he knew or had any reason to anticipate that the bread truck was going to leave the traveled portion of the highway and strike him down as he was standing
close to his parked automobile, and when the court adds that
the deceased must be deemed to have assumed the risk of
his course of conduct, it again would give the impression
that the deceased placed himself in a position of obvious
peril, and that he thereby assumed the risk of his course of
conduct by getting out of the left hand side of his automobile.
Furthermore, Instruction No. 7 is prejudicial to the plaintiff
herein because nowhere in the instruction dirl the court say
that the conduct of the deceased should have been the proximate contributing cause of the accident.
The court instructed the- jury in Instruction No. 3 that
18
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contributory negligence means that a person injured has proximately contributed to such injury by his want of ordinary care;
but the court by Instruction No. 7 entirely departs from this
instruction to bring an entirely new theory into the case other
than the duty to exercise ordinary care and, as we view the
instruction considered in the light of the evidence, is tantamount
to a directed verdict in favor of the defendants. We think
at all events the rule of law that would be applicable under
the circumstances in this case is simply the exercise of ordinary
care in view of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the deceased at the time of the accident.
The court by Instruction No. 5 placed that duty of ordinary
care upon the defendants for the purpose of measuring the
conduct of the defendants and no greater duty should have
been placed upon the deceased. We submit that the court by
defendants' request of Instruction No. 7 was prevailed upon
to depart from the rule requiring the exercise of ordinary
care and to place upon the deceased a much greater duty and
obligation than was justified under any of the testimony or
evidence adduced at the trial. In other words, we think that
if the facts justify an instruction along the line of Instruction
No. 7, then the jury should have been told that it was the duty
of the deceased in getting out of his station wagon to exercise
ordinary care in observing the conditions of travel along 13th
South Street at and near the point of the accident, and that if
the jury from the testimony believed that the deceased failed
to exercise ordinary care in view of all of the facts and circumstances in alighting from his automobile or failed to
observe traffic along said street which was then and there
open and obvious, and if the jury believed that such want
of ordinary care was the proximate or contributing cause
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of the resulting injury and death of the deceased, that then
their verdict should be for the defendants and against the
plaintiff.
We think the rule of law which should control the question of the deceased's contributory negligence is set forth in
the cases hereinafter cited, to the effect that the rule of contributory negligence gives no support to a claim that a driver
of an automobile or truck may heedlessly run down those
who are where they have a right to be, and particularly so
where reasonable men may differ concerning the pruden(e
exercised by the injured person. It was pointed out by this
Court in the Case of BARKER vs. SAVAS, 52 Ut. 262, 172 Pac.
672, that if the defendant had looked ahead as was his duty to
do, there was nothing to prevent his seeing the deceased; that
it was his duty to look ahead in the exercise of reasonable
care, and that his duty to so look is generally recognized as
to be beyond all controversy.
The defendant Savas was driving his car north on Redwood road at the same time a 6 year old child was riding a
tricycle north of the easterly side of Redwood Road.· The
child was struck by the defendant's car causing fatal injuries.
The following is cited from the Savas case (Page 674):
"But it is contended by appellant that there is no
evidence of negligence on his part, or want of due
care in driving his machine. The circumstances tend
to show that the deceased was riding his tricycle on
the east side of the road, near the very edge of the
traveled thoroughfare, where he should have been in
the exercise of reasonable care. Huddy on Automobiles
(3d Ed.) Sec. 120."
·
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LZ

"All of the remainder of the road lying west of
where the deceased was riding was open to the defendant. He was behind the deceased, with nothing to obscure or obstruct his vision. If he had looked ahead,
as was his duty to do, there was nothing to prevent
his seeing the deceased in time to avoid the collision.
That it was his duty to look ahead in the exercise of
reasonable care, in cases of this kind, is so generally
recognized as a legal duty as to be beyond all controversy. Indeed the doctrine is elementary.''
"In this case the deceased was riding his tricycle on
the highway, as he had the right to do. He was riding
north, and the circumstances indicate he was on the
extreme east side of the road, as was his duty in the
exercise of reasonable care. Defendant's automobile
approached from the rear. His vision was unobstructed;
he could have seen deceased if he had looked, and the
law imposed upon him that duty."
"As regards the question of the deceased's negligence, the evidence tends to show affirmatively that
he was not negligent. Besides this, if it be said that a
child of his age can be guilty of contributory negligence,
in this case there being no evidence to the contrary,
the law presumes he was in the exercise of due care,
and the burden was on the defendant to rebut this
presumption. LEWIS V. RAILROAD CO., 40 Utah,
483, and cases cited at pages 494 and 495, 123 Pac. 97."
See also the case of REAGAN v. LOS ANGELES ICE &
COLD STORAGE CO., (Cal), reported in 189 Pac. 474.
The facts in this case are as follows:

t'l'
:~

1

A Buick touring car of the plaintiff was parked close to
the curb and headed in an easterly direction on the street.
21
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The plaintiff and another man were standing on the left hand
side of the car. The street at that point was from 60 to 70
feet wide. The day was clear. At the moment of the accident,
the plaintiff was standing close to and back of the left rear
mud guard of his car. Plaintiff was struck by defendant's oncoming machine and killed.
Quoting from Page 475 of the Decision:
"The rules of law applicable to such cases are well
established. The negligence of a plaintiff which directly contributes to his injury bars recovery. One using
a public street is charged with the duty of observing
approaching vehicles, it is true, but this rule is qualified
and explained by the more general rule that, except
in cases where the law itself fixes a standard of care,
negligence is always relative and to be determined in
view of all the circumstances of the particular case.
Thus, if there was a plainly visible obstruction in a
street, a person taking position on or immediately in
front of it would be in a position of safety and might
be relieved from the duty of observing traffic as he
would be if he remained on the sidewalk. The standing
automobile was a clearly visible obstruction in the course
of the on-coming truck. Whether its driver simply
continued in a straight course along the curving street,
or, as some of the witnesses testified swerved towards
the obstruction, is of no importance. He heedlessly
drove the truck upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
in a position where, if it could not be said, as a matter
of law, he had a right to assume he would not be run
down, ~easonable prudent men might have drawn that
concluston of fact. It certainly cannot be said as a matter
of law that he was guilty of negligence. The rule of contribut~ry negligence gives no support to the claim that
the dnver of an automobile or truck may heedlessly or
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wantonly run down those who are where they have a
right to be, particularly if reasonable when may differ
concerning the prudence exercised by the injured person."
ISS"
STEPHENSON v. PARTON et al. (Wash), ~ Pac. 147:
The facts in this case are as follows:
The plaintiff had parked on the left hand side of the
road with his wagon, used by him as a mail carrier. While
standing on the right side of his wagon and in plain view of
the defendant's on-coming vehicle, he was struck and killed.
It was a bright clear day, the road was level and smooth, the
road \vas 17 feet wide and no traffic. W'e quote from the
opinion, Page 149, as follows:
"In Lewis v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 72 Wash. 320, 130
Pac. 341, we said:
'The footman may rely on the presumption that, so
long as he occupies one place or pursues a given course·,
he need not be run into, and to fail to keep a lookout
for the approach of such vehicles is not necessarily
want of care. The degree of care required of such a
person of course varies with the circumstances. It depends largely upon place and upon the condition of the
street; whether the street is crowded with traffic or
comparatively free therefrom; whether he enters lhe
street at a place usually used by travelers on foot, and
perhaps on many other conditions; but the degree of
care required is ordinary care under the circumstt~.nces;
and this, as we say, may be vastly different from orJinary care with reference to crossing fixed tracks upon
which railway or street cars are operated.' "
"It follows that if the deceased was standing in the
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road attending to his business, it w~s de~rly the duty
of Miss Parton to avoid him in passmg wtth her automobile, especially where there was ample room for so
doing."
GOOSCHIN v. LADD 33 P.(2d), (Wash.), 653:
The accident happened January 18, 1932, at about 12:45
A.M. near the city of Seattle. The plaintiff had attempted to
back his automobile off the pavement and became stuck in
the mud and was unable to move it therefrom. The evidence
is in dispute whether his car was 2, 3, or 4 feet off the pavement. While he was standing by his left front fender, he
was struck by an on-coming vehicle. We quote from the opinion,
Page 655:

"It is first contended that the respondent was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The
evidence upon the question as to whether the left front
of the Hudson was off or on the pavement is in dispute.
The respondent says that the left front of the Hudson
was ' * * * about two or two and a half feet from the
pavement. I am quite certain of that. I was standing
in that parking, between the pavement and my front,
left front. I was clear off the highway. My lights were
working that night. They were on all the time. They
were on at the time that I last remember. I did not at
any time see this car that struck me. I never saw it. I
did not see it before·J got out of the car. I looked around
and I couldn't see anything. I didn't see anything approaching then.' "
"Other witnesses testified that the left front of the
respondent's car extended out onto the pavement about
4 feet. If the respondent's car was entirely clear of the
pavement and he was standing in the space between
24
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the edge of the pavement and the car, we see nothing
upon which to base the charge of contributory negligence."
FABRICIUS v. VIEIRA et al. (Cal.) 233 P. 397:
The facts in the case are as follows:
On a Sunday afternoon about 3·:00 o'clock, the plaintiff
had occasion to drive his car off the paved part of the highway
to the right and stop same because of motor trouble. Evidence
shows he was parked from 18 inches to 4 feet off the edge of
the pavement. Defendant's testimony showed he was from
2V2 to 3 feet from the edge of the pavement. Plaintiff was
standing in a stooped position on the left side of his automobile adjusting the carburetor when the defendant's oncoming truck struck the plaintiff and caused the injuries of
which complaint is made. The pavement was 18 feet wide at
the scene of the accident, and plaintiff could have parked his
automobile at a greater distance from pavement. He made
no effort to observe approaching vehicles while adjusting the
carburetor.
We quote as follows from Page 397:
·'There is no doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the driver of the truck was guilty
of actionable negligence which was the proximate
cause of the injury. It is equally clear that the evidence
does not show, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence. These conclusions so clearly appear from a mere statement of the
evidence that further discussion is deemed unnecessary,"
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In the case of DEITCHLER v. BALL (Wash.) 170 Pac. 123,
the plaintiff was struck by the defendants' truck while he was
standing by his car putting up the top and fastening the straps
over the front to hold the top down. It was claimed that the
plaintiff under such circumstances was guilty of contributory
negligence, but the court said:
"It was not necessary for him to pay particular attention to passers-by who had plenty of room to avoid
him. The respondent, no doubt, as contended by the
appellant, was required to use ordinary, reasonable
care for his safety, and if his testimony is to be believed
at all, he did so when he was standing close to his
car attending to his business, and was not putting himself in the way of danger."
A rather recent <:ase, HADLEYv. SIMPSON, 115 Pac. 2 (d)
675, held that travelers on the highways are justified in assuming that other drivers will observe the rules of the road and
may act upon that assumption without being guilty of contributory negligence. Citing: Richmond v. Tacoma Railway
&Power Co., 67 Wash. 44, 122 P. 351; Stubbs v. Molberget,
108 Wash. 89, 182 P. 936, 6 A.L.R. 318.
In thecaseofSHANNONv. THO.MAS (Cal) 134Pac2(d)
522, the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's automobile
while pushing his automobile down the highway. The court
said:
"Furthermore, it must be said that reasonable minds
could at least well differ as to whether appellants were
justified in assuming they could make the turn with
reasonable safety, and it must not be forgotten that
appellants had a right to assume that respondent would
observe them making the turn on the highway, and
26
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therefore slacken his speed or make a turn to the right
or left of appellant's vehicle thereby avoiding a collision. Kennedy v. Berg, 18 Cal. App. 2d 53, 62 P.2d
1374; Flury v. Beeskau, 139 Cal. App. 398, 33 P. 2d
1033."
In the case of HAYES v. AXELRED, 332 Pa. 518 3A 2d 346
( 1939), the plaintiff was a milkman, and was alighting on
the left side from his wagon, and a~ down on the lowest
step when he was struck by the defendant. He was parked
close to the curb of the street, and there was ample width for
two vehicles to pass without crowding each other. The accident happened on a clear day.
"In affirming the judgment, the court said: "It is
obvious that plaintiff made out a case of negligence
against defendant. It was in evidence that the accident
happened on a 'clear day.' In order to hit the plaintiff
defendant's car must have been running closer to the
milk wagon than is consistent with due care. Plaintiff's wagon . . . was parked close to the curb on a
street of ample width for two vehicles to pass without
'crowding' each other ... As defendant's truck was in
rapid motion, it was the duty of the driver to look
where he was going ... At the argument (defendant)
stressed plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence.
Under the facts of this case it cannot be declared as
a matter of law that the plaintiff did not disclose a case
free from contributory negligence. Plaintiff had a right
to assume that while he was on the step of his milk
wagon, attending to his accustomed business, he would
not be struck by any vehicle that was under proper
control. He had not placed himself in a position of
manifest danger.'' ''
27
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POINT II
Appellant further asserts that the court erred in instructing
the jury by Instruction No. 10 as follows (T. 18 duly excepted
to T. 208):
"You are instructed that every person is bound to
the exercise of vigilance with the view to discovery of
perils by which he may be menaced and their avoidance
after they are ascertained. Every person is bound to use
due diligence to save his person from injury by the negligent act of another.

If you find from the evidence in this case that the
deceased, Arnold Kartchner, failed to exercise vigilance
to discover the approach of traffic and particularly to
discove~ the truck being then and there operated by
Montel Mangum and that such failure to exercise vigilance was a proximate cause of the fatal injury sustained by the said Arnold Kartchner, then your verdict
must be in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, no cause of action."
By the foregoing instruction the court placed on the
deceased a duty of vigilance thereby departing from the rule
of ordinary care. There is no evidence in the record that the
deceased failed to exercise ordinary care when he parked his
automobile at the curb and left the same from the left hand
or north door. The defendants' truck after turning east on
13th South traveled only a distance of 167 feet until it struck
the deceased's body. At a speed of 20 miles per hour this
would require only a matter of seconds. It is quite apparent
that when the deceased parked his automobile, the bread truck
would not have been in view.
28
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The witness Keith Roberg on cross-examination was
asked:

Q. "Keith, was Uncle Arnold talking to you when he got
out of the car?"
A. "No. Not after he closed the door."

(T. 109).

This would infer that they did have some conversation after
deceased got out of the car and before he closed the door so
that when the deceased got out of the station wagon and probably had a conversation with Keith and then closed the door
this would have taken up at least 7 to 10 seconds and the
driver of the truck testified to traveling 20 miles per hour or
30 feet per second. This would manifestly show and prove
that the defendants' truck was not in view of the deceased at
the time he got out of his station wagon. Further, it proves
that the deceased was in dear view of the defendants' truck
driver during all of the time that he was traveling east on
13th South and consequently had ample time to have avoided
striking and killing the deceased, had he been looking as was
his legal duty to do so. It is also clear that when he opened
the door of his car to alight therefrom, the bread truck would
not have been in such a position on the roadway as to indicate
danger to the deceased. In this position, the deceased had a
right to assume that any cars traveling east on 13th South
would not leave the ordinary traveled portion of the highway
as did the bread truck, and run over into the parking area.

If a duty of vigilance rested upon the deceased, it would
be difficult to point out in what way the deceased failed to
exercise vigilance or ordinary care under the circumstances surrounding the accident. We can see no facts which would cast
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upon the deceased the duty to exercise vigilance under the etrcumstances disclosed by the evidence for the purpose of discovering a motor vehicle which at the time of the accident was
being operated entirely off the portion of the highway normally
used by motor vehicles. There is no evidence in the record
that the deceased knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
could have anticipated that the bread truck would suddenly
leave the traveled portion of the highway and proceed directly
toward the deceased. To say to the jury as the court did in
Instruction No. 10 that if they believed from the evidence
that the deceased failed to exercise vigilance to discover the
approach of the bread truck simply invites the attention of
the jury to a situation concerning which there is no evidence
upon which the jury could possibly make such a finding. To
say that every person is bound to exercise vigilance with the
view to discovery of perils is not a correct application of a
legal principle unless some facts or circumstances are shown
which require vigilance in the exercise of reasonable care.
The cases which we have cited under Point I are all applicable to Instruction No. 10 and reference to all of said cases
is hereby made in support of the appellant's claim that Instruction No. 10 was erroneous and prejudicial to the rights
of the appellant.
We think the holdings of the court in the Deitchler and
Hadley cases cited herein are peculiarly applicable to the
situation of the deceased in the case at bar. It was not necessary for him to pay particular attention to passers-by who
had plenty of room to avoid him. The deceased did not place
himself in the way of any danger that was open or obvious
and he had the right to assume that motorists upon the highway would exercise reasonable care and would not depart
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from the traveled portion of the highway and run into the
deceased while he was in a comparative place of safety, also
that deceased was required to use ordinary care, and he did
so, when he stood close to his car attending to his own business, and such were the facts in the instant case.
POINT NO. III
The defendants' answer (T. 5) sets up four defenses:
First, that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; second, an admission and denial of portions of the plaintiffs
complaint; third, that the death of the deceased was solely
and proximate~y caused by his own negligence; and fourth,
that the deceased was himself guilty of contributory negligence which was a substantial, proximate cause of his death.
No defense is set forth in the defendants' answer that the
deceased assumed the risk of the danger to which he was subjected by the operation of the defendants' truck.
Notwithstanding the failure to allege the defense of
the assumption of risk, the court in Instruction No. 7 told
the jury that if the deceased placed himself in a position of
peril when there was no reasonable justification therefor, that
then the deceased assumed the risk of his course of conduct.
We submit that this was not an issue properly to be submitted to the jury for want of a proper pleading. Furthermore, as we have heretofore attempted to set forth, there was
no fact or circumstances in evidence from which any inference
could be drawn that the deceased voluntarily placed himself
in a position of danger or obvious peril. \X' e further submit
that the evidence fails to disclose any conduct on the part of
the deceased from which the inference could be drawn that
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he was guilty of any negligence proximately contributing to
the accident.
The courts generally have recognized that there is a clear
dictinction between the defense of assumption of risk and the
defense of contributory negligence, notwithstanding that they
may arise under the same set of facts and may sometimes overlap. The defense of assumption of risk ordinarily involves a
choice made more or less deliberately without reference to
the fact of the exercise of due care. The principal element
of the defense of assumption of risk is knowledge and ap·
preciation of danger. The doctrine under the authorities
does not apply unless the particular condition of danger or
peril has continued long enough so that the person alleged
to have assumed the risk can be said to have known or to have
been charged with knowledge of the danger. The application
of the defense of assumption of risk more frequently arises
out of the relationship of master and servant. In ot_her actions,
the defense is usually .confined to cases where the plaintiff
not only knew and appreciated the danger, but voluntarily
put himself in the way of it. (See 38 Am. Jur., Title "Negigence," Sections 171-1 7 3) .
As will be noted from the defendant's answer (T. 5), the
doctrine of assumption of risk was never pleaded as a defense
and there is not one iota of evidence introduced in this action
to substantiate or support the doctrine of assumption of risk.
Therefore, the court in giving Instruction No. 7 particularly
and also Instruction No. 10 erred OQ. these grounds and we
quote from the case of HILLYARD v. BAIR, 47 Ut. 561,
155 Pac. 449, at Page 450:
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"It is a well recognized rule of law that the instructions to the jury should conform to the issues presented
by the pleadings and those raised by the evidence. w· e
think the instruction complained of clearly offends
against this rule."
See also the following case, DAVIS v. 11IDVALE CITY,
56 Ut. 1, 189 Pac. 74, and particularly Page 78 and we quote
from therein as follows:
"Instructions should be confined to the issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence. It is improper
to give an instruction announcing a naked legal proposition, however correct it may be, unless it bears upon
and is connected with the issues involved; and unless,
further, there has been received some competent evidence to which the jury may apply it. Such an instruction tends to distract the minds of the jury from the
real question submitted to them for determination,
and· thereby mislead them, and, if requested, may be
properly refused." 38 Cyc. 1612, 161;·.
"In determining ·the scope of its instructions, the
court must keep in mind the issues made by the pleadings in the cause; and the general rule is that all instructions must be confined to those issues, and the
evidence in support thereof, and that no instruction
should be given which tenders an issue that is not
supported by the pleadings or which deviates therefrom
in any material respect." 14 R.C.L. 784, 785.
"Instructions to a jury must be based upon, and be
applicable to, the pleadings and evidence. Instructions
should be neither broader nor narrower than the pleadings, they should be predicated on all the issues raised
by the pleadings and supported by the evidence, and
33
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they are equally faulty whether they enlarge or restrict
the issues.''
Also many cases are cited to substantiate this position.
It is our position in the instant case that the court erred
in giving Instruction No. 7 particularly on the assumption of
risk doctrine, when it was never plead and no evidence introduced thereon, thereby making it highly prejudicial to the
rights of the plaintiff in this action.

In construing the evidence we must have in mind that
generally speaking every person has the right to assume that
another will obey the law and perform his duty. The presumption is that duties fixed by law will be discharged accordingly and everyone to whom a duty of care is owing has a
right to assume that it will be performed in compliance with
the law under which it arises. The failure of a plaintiff to
anticipate the negligence of another does not constitute negligence on his part. (See 38 Am. Jur., Title: "Negligence,"
Section 192).
POINT NO.4
With respect to Point 4, we wish to call the court's
attention to plaintiff's Request No. 3 which was refused by
the Court and is worded as follows:

•

"If you believe from the evidence that the deceased,
Arnold G. Kartchner, was standing at the left front
door of his automobile or was in the act of leaving
or had just left his car by the said left front door at
the time of the accident, and that said car was parked
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on or near the sidewalk running in an easterly and
westerly direction on the south side of 13th South, then
the court instructs you that the said Arnold G. Kartchner was in a place where he had a legal right to be,
and if you believe from the evidence that he was struck
by defendants' truck at said time and place and thereby
was injured and died as a result of the injury, then
the court instructs you that the plaintiff in this case
would have a right to recover for the death of said Arnold G. Kartchner in such an amount as you shall find
under all of the circumstances as may be just."
It is our contention that the court erred in failing to give
this request in toto, substantially, or in a modified form as we
think that this is the law that is applicable to the facts in the
instant case, particularly that the said Arnold G. Kartchner,
the deceased was in a place where he had a legal right to be,
and that the defendants' driver was definitely negligent in
leaving the main traveled highway and striking the deceased
while he was standing very near his station wagon. This contention is supported by the cases heretofore cited in this brief.
We respectfully submit that in view of the established
physical facts considered in the light of a fair interpretation
of the evidence that Instructions No. 7 and 10 failed to correctly state the law; that the court misapplied the application
of the doctrine of assumption of risk; that the court erred 111
not giving plaintiffs request No. 3, all of which were prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff and the heirs-at-law of said
deceased; that the judgment of no cause of action should be
vacated and set aside and a new trial ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
JOE P. BOSONE,
A.H.HOUGAARD
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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